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PREVENTABLE DISEASE

Process trumps potential public good: better
vaccine safety through linked cross-jurisdictional
immunisation data in Australia
Katherine M. Duszynski,1,2 Nicole L. Pratt,3 John W. Lynch,2 Annette Braunack-Mayer,2,4 Lee K. Taylor,5 Jesia G. Berry,1
Vicki Xafis,2 Jim Buttery,6,7 Michael S. Gold1 on behalf of the Vaccine Assessment Using Linked Data (VALiD) Working Group

T

he benefits of vaccines are globally
acknowledged. Nevertheless, periodic
concerns emerge regarding adverse
events following immunisation (AEFI). Newly
developed vaccines have incomplete safety
profiles at the time of licensure because of
limited participant enrolment in clinical trials
and short duration of safety surveillance.
Trials usually omit the vulnerable populations
targeted by government vaccination
programmes, including infants, pregnant
women and the elderly. Common and acute
reactions are readily identified, while rare and
delayed AEFI may be missed without further
assessment.

Without thorough assessment of all AEFI,
appropriate government, regulatory and
manufacturer action cannot be taken.
Community confidence in immunisation
benefits may waiver, resulting in reduced
vaccine coverage, as became apparent for
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination
in Denmark1,2 and Japan3; and disease
resurgence, as occurred with the measles–
mumps–rubella vaccine in the United
Kingdom.4,5
To detect AEFI and mitigate the impact of
any suspected concerns, the World Health
Organization advocates all countries
implement a post-licensure vaccine safety
surveillance system.6 One recommended
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approach is a passive surveillance system
(PSS), relying on reports submitted
to regulatory agencies from health
professionals, industry and community.
One PSS aim is ‘signal detection’, and this
is undertaken by the Therapeutic Goods
Administration in Australia. Collated AEFI
reports are examined for patterns involving

specific or groups of vaccines that may
then need further investigation. However,
as reports are generally non-mandatory,
considerable under-reporting exists and
is coupled with difficulty in determining
numbers of administered vaccines. Signal
evaluation is compromised, impeding
assessment of a causal association between
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a vaccine and adverse event. Data linkage,
or the matching and joining of records
from administrative datasets, has been
extensively used internationally, as a means
of safety assessment. In the United States
and Scandinavian countries, analysis of
linked data has been used to both identify
and refute associations between specific
vaccines and adverse outcomes.7-10 A wholeof-population linked dataset enhances the
scope, representativeness and population size
for epidemiological assessments of vaccine
safety.
Australia is well placed to employ data
linkage for safety assessment of vaccines.
Since 1996, routine childhood immunisations
have been captured on the Australian
Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR),
which was extended to all ages as the
Australian Immunisation Register (AIR) in
2016. Adolescent human papillomavirus
(HPV) immunisations have been recorded on
the HPV Register since 2007, with data also
integrated with AIR since late 2018. These
registries have potential to be linked with
other administrative data collections, such
as jurisdictional hospital datasets and the
National Death Index (NDI), to enable signal
evaluation. However, application of linked
administrative datasets for vaccine safety
monitoring in Australia has been limited to
a single investigation, the South Australian
Vaccine Safety (SAVeS) study.11
In late 2008, a team of investigators embarked
on the Australian Research Council-funded
study VALiD. The study objective was to
investigate the acceptability and feasibility
of linking Australian Government (hereafter
AusGov) and jurisdictional data collections
to evaluate the safety of vaccines. Two
policy developments preceded project
commencement. Firstly in 2006, the National
Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy
(NCRIS) identified population health and
data linkage as a key priority for research
investment. Enhanced data linkage capability
was anticipated to expedite epidemiological
research, leading to improvements in
clinical practice and delivery of health
and social services.12 Secondly, two new
vaccines were included on the NIP in 2007:
a second-generation rotavirus vaccine
(RV) protecting against diarrhoeal disease
in children, and the HPV vaccine against
cervical cancer. The nascent safety profiles
of these vaccines warranted post-licensure
surveillance, particularly since first-generation
RVs were withdrawn in the US following
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identification of the vaccine’s increased risk
of intussusception (bowel obstruction).13-15
Safety data for the HPV vaccine were also
limited due to its recent introduction, with
Australia the first country to include the
vaccine in a funded national schedule.
This paper describes the complexities
encountered in accessing cross-jurisdictional
data for linkage with the ACIR to establish
a national linked dataset for vaccine
safety evaluation. We suggest a series of
recommendations for improving access and
timely delivery of linked datasets to enhance
safety surveillance.

Methods
Data sources
Eleven data sources from two federal and
five jurisdictional agencies were identified
for linkage in the VALiD study (Table 1).
Linkage occurred in stages due to delays in
approval for release of jurisdictional data.
Two project datasets were created with
the ACIR as the primary data source: 1) a
national linkage with death registration
records from the NDI (1999–2010); and 2)
a cross-jurisdictional linkage with hospital
inpatient and emergency department (ED)
attendance records (2003–2013) from four of
five jurisdictions: South Australia, New South
Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Western
Australia (WA) withdrew in the final stages of
approval (December 2015), citing legislative
restrictions preventing release of hospital
data to external agencies. Established in
1996, the ACIR maintains records of all
immunisations (specified by the National
Immunisation Schedule) administered to
children up to 7 years of age. This includes

Table 1: Data collections linked for the VALiD study.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
AIHW
QLD

Dataset name
Australian Childhood Immunisation Register
National Death Index
Hospital Admitted Patient Data Collection
Emergency Department Information System

NSW
SA

Mater Hospital Emergency Department
Information System
Admitted Patient Data Collection
Emergency Department Data Collection
Integrated South Australian Activity
Collection

WA

Emergency Department Data Collection
Hospital Morbidity Data Collection

VIC

Emergency Department Data Collection
Victorian Admitted Episodes Dataset
Victorian Emergency Minimum Dataset

up to 21 separate vaccinations, protecting
against 14 diseases, which are administered
at six intervals during childhood.16 The ACIR
records child name, address, demographic
information, aboriginality, immunisation
history (including vaccine administered, date
of immunisation, dose and batch number)
and provider contact information.

Linkage methodology – the model we
proposed
Initially, we proposed linking datasets by
replicating the methodology implemented
for the SAVeS project,11,17 where linkage of
immunisation and hospital data for South
Australian (SA) children was conducted
by the SA Department of Health (SADH).
When meeting with AusGov agencies
(November 2009), we presented two linkage
models: a centralised model involving SADH
taking responsibility for linking all required
datasets and a distributed model, where
ACIR identifiers would be sent to individual
jurisdictions to perform state-based
linkage with hospital data. However, a new
policy introduced by the Commonwealth
Department of Health required a different
linkage methodology for AusGov data.
Launched as ‘High Level Principles for Data
Integration involving Commonwealth Data’ in
February 2010,18 this policy stated linkage of
AusGov datasets could only be undertaken by
an approved agency or ‘integrating authority’.
At the time of application, two integrating
authorities had received accreditation for
linking AusGov data: the Australian Bureau
of Statistics and the Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare (AIHW), with the latter
subsequently assigned as the linkage agency
for the VALiD project.

Linkage methodology – the model
prescribed by the Australian
Government
The best practice protocol for data linkage
stipulates that person identifiers (name,
address, demographic) used for matching
information between administrative datasets
should be kept separate from those relating
to an individual’s health information (e.g.
immunisations, deaths, hospitalisations).19
This ‘separation principle’ ensures individuals’
confidentiality and privacy are protected,
with linkage staff having no access to
health information components. Similarly,
researchers never receive access to person
identifiers, preventing potential matching
of health information to specific individuals.
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Following matching of identifiers, aFigure
national1: Overview of process and range of approvals/agreements required for securing release of
Figure 1: Overview of process and range of approvals/agreements required for securing release of crosslinkage key (NLK) was generated and
sent to
cross‐jurisdictional
and Commonwealth data for linkage
jurisdictional and Commonwealth data for linkage.
data custodians to attach health information.
The NLK comprised two identification
numbers – a new Person ID and encrypted
Local Record ID assigned by the data
•Preliminary advice on data
custodian with the latter removed following
availability (e.g. dataset
attachment of health data.
identification and variable
Planning
The AIHW implemented a variation to best
practice linking methodology in handling
AusGov data, receiving both identifier
and health data extracts. Within the AIHW,
partitioning of extracts was achieved by
having separate data processing domains for
receipt of identifier information and health
data. Following linkage, integrated data were
sent to a secure, remote access computing
facility known as ‘SURE’ (Secure Unified
Research Environment), hosted by the Sax
Institute in NSW.

Results

Protocol
preparation

Institutional
approval

Commonwealth
approvals

Process and scope of approvals for
data access
Figure 1 outlines the process, scope of
approvals and agreements required before
data linkage could proceed. Extensive
negotiation was required between 18
different agencies to obtain 21 separate
authorisations and 12 ethics approvals.
Approvals were needed from four domains:
Australian Government agencies, state-based
authorities, ancillary organisations comprising
linkage and data curating facilities, and
human research ethics committees (HRECs).
The process commenced with developing a
study protocol and initial ethics submission
to the University HREC. While the submission
was under review, approval for data release
was first sought from the AusGov Department
of Health. Release of ACIR immunisation data
for linkage and analysis required three tiers
of approval: legislative, policy authority and
administrative. Legislative approval involved
review of the relevant Commonwealth
statute (Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth))
regulating the function and management
of ACIR. While disclosure of immunisation
information was permitted in a restricted
range of circumstances, including research,
only non-identifiable information could be
released. Non-identifiable data, however,
are impracticable for data linkage activities
that require person identifiers for dataset
matching. Consequently, approval in the form
of a Public Interest Certificate (PIC) signed by
the data custodian, or their delegate, was
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composition) & data
request process

State
approvals

Linkage
agency
approvals
SURE data
curating
agreements

necessary to provide legislative exemption to
data release protections.
Before delegate approval could be granted,
policy authority was required from the
relevant AusGov section with procedural
responsibility for the ACIR dataset. During
this process, overall project objectives and
proposed methodology were reviewed by
the Immunisation Branch together with
an assessment of the risks of data release
weighed against the potential public
benefit of data provision. Procedural review
for the VALiD project progressed through
four levels of governance to achieve policy

•Ethics application(s)

•Legal review
•Ethics application
•Policy endorsement
•Public Interest Certificate
•Medicare External Review Committee
•SA Health
•QLD Health
•QLD Mater Health Services
•WA Health
•NSW Ministry of Health
•VIC Dept of Health

•Ethics applications
•Research Agreement

•Institutional Head Agreement
•Researcher Agreements

authorisation. In-principle approval for
release of ACIR data for the VALiD project
was granted in February 2011, some 2.5 years
after project commencement. A further 14
months ensued before the PIC, authorising
release of the immunisation register data, was
conferred in April 2012. Our ARC competitive
grant ended in 2010.
The final AusGov authorisation before
data release to AIHW involved approval
from the Commonwealth Department of
Human Services (DHS). This Department
had administrative responsibility for the
dataset and was ultimately responsible for
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preparing and sending the data extract
to the assigned integrating authority. This
required a further application to the Medicare
External Requests Review Committee and,
while timely approval was secured, a further
year ensued before data were extracted
and transferred to the AIHW in May 2013.
Additional requirements supplementary
to the Commonwealth process included
completion of Confidentiality Deed Polls for
those investigators accessing data.
In summary, provision of AusGov approval
took almost four years from the initial request
for data access in August 2008, with a further
year before ACIR data were transferred to
the AIHW for the first linkage. An additional
14 months was required for linkage and
provision of data, due to re-issue of ACIR
data following identification of data integrity
issues related to same-individual duplications
in person identifier number. This process
was completed in August 2014, six years
after our initial consultation with the AusGov
Department of Health.

Jurisdictional and ethics approvals
The jurisdictional request process was
similarly multi-layered and protracted
(Table 2). Broadly, this involved agency
consultation, identifying required datasets,
selecting relevant variables, completion of
a data application (and additional forms
where necessary), securing data custodian
approval and, finally, ethics application. No
two jurisdictions were the same in their
approach to sanctioning data release. Time
to securing data release ranged from nine
months in NSW, to more than four years
for Victorian data. In NSW, the application
process required receipt of the AusGov PIC
documentation before an ethics application
could be submitted, delaying completion of
state approval processes until secured.

Multiple ethics approvals were also required.
The significant delay in acquiring approval
for data release from the ACIR delayed
submissions for release of state hospital
data, effectively separating our research
objectives into two projects and two
separate linkage processes. Submissions
included two Commonwealth, six state,
two institutional and two linkage agency
applications. This resulted in 12 (rather than
nine) separate ethics submissions seeking
approval of ACIR linkage with the NDI, and
then hospital datasets. Three jurisdictions also
required additional submissions to statebased Aboriginal Health Ethics Committees
for approval relating to the release of an
Indigenous identifier.

Other approvals and agreements
Other approvals and agreements included
a (data) Risk Assessment completed by the
AIHW and submitted to Commonwealth DHS.
Researcher and institutional agreements
were also needed for the linkage agency’s
data storage facility (SURE). Confidentiality
agreements with states were also required.

Data linkage methodology

As well as being non-uniform, the extent of
documentation varied between jurisdictions,
sometimes involving a single application
form (such as Queensland’s Public Health
Application) to additional documents
such as Privacy Forms (NSW) and technical
feasibility assessments (NSW, WA, SA). In SA,
QLD and WA, executive approvals were also
required for trans-border flow of data to the
AIHW and/or release of data from hospital
area health services. Due to differences
in hospital funding arrangements, two
application processes for release of hospital
data were undertaken in QLD involving the
QLD Health Statistics Unit and Mater Health
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Services (ED data only from former Mater
Children’s Hospital) with the latter requiring
considerable documentation.

Three variations of the data linkage model
were implemented across agencies
contributing data. Model 1 involving NSW,
QLD Health and SA complied strictly with
the best practice protocol.19 Each jurisdiction
only supplied AIHW with hospital-derived
person identifiers for linkage with ACIR
identifiers. The resulting NLK was then
returned to jurisdictions for appending
health data extracts, then uploaded to SURE.
Model 2 involved supply of AusGov ACIR
data and QLD Mater ED data. These agencies
sent both person identifier and health data
extracts to separate domains within AIHW.
Following processing and linkage, health data
extracts were similarly attached to the NLK
before transfer to SURE. Model 3 applied to
linkage of Victorian hospital data. Provisional
enquiries seeking access to Victorian hospital
data commenced in November 2009.
However, these negotiations were suspended
until September 2012, when AusGov approval
for release of immunisation data was assured.
Initially, person identifier variables from the
Victorian hospital datasets and approved
health data extracts were to be supplied to
the AIHW as described for Model 1. Identifier

variables were restricted to date of birth,
gender, postcode and residential suburb.
During consultation, the ‘Better Patient
Data’ project, designed to improve linkage
specificity, was undertaken by the Victorian
Department of Health in 2014. This initiative
expanded the range of identifiers available
from the Patient Master Index of Victorian
hospitals and involved adding names and
addresses to retrospective data holdings from
all Victorian hospitals. The expanded person
identifier set was made available to the AIHW
in late 2016, while health data from Victorian
hospitals were derived from AIHW hospital
data collections, to be added to the NLK,
creating the third linkage model.

Datasets
Variation in data characteristics and variable
formats were also noted across jurisdictional
data sources. For example, state hospital
datasets varied in availability of named data
for linkage, limiting observation periods. In
WA, for example, named separations data
from public hospitals were from 1970; in QLD,
only from 1995. In SA, named separations
data were available from July 2003 onwards
and for Victoria from mid-2010, although
work is ongoing to expand named data back
to mid-2005. Another inconsistency related to
data variables released. Specific justifications
were required for release of date of birth so
that researchers could apply the most basic of
epidemiological analyses – age adjustments
– to ensure comparability of risks relative to
age for AEFI. Most states prevented release
of the postcode variable, instead providing
a coded measure of geographic location
and socioeconomic status for health data.
However, coded measures were inconsistent
across jurisdictions, with some states
providing broader geographic locations such
as statistical local areas.

Cost
Various costs were associated with creating
the two linkage datasets. These included
costs (GST exclusive) for ACIR (linkage 1:
$9,580; linkage 2: $6,588) and state data
extracts ($0 in SA, QLD & VIC and $34,000 in
NSW), linkage services (linkage 1: $18,900;
linkage 2: $59,600) and access to the SURE
facility over four years ($31,233). Excluding
indirect personnel time in administrating
approvals, direct costs for the VALiD study
totalled almost $126,000, although the
true cost was higher due to all jurisdictions
absorbing fees for data extracts. Final
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personnel costs during the application
stage were difficult to estimate, as research
personnel prepared other study components
in addition to the data linkage applications
and negotiation of approvals. Conservatively,
we estimate personnel time expended on
approval activities across the six state and
Commonwealth jurisdictions was one year’s
duration – equivalent to $95,000 base salary
with on-costs for a mid-level research person.

Discussion
This paper describes the complex and
convoluted application, approval and
operational processes to link crossjurisdictional and AusGov data to establish
a national linked dataset for vaccine safety
signal evaluation. The cost (direct and
personnel) and time to secure approvals
for data linkage in Australia is clearly
impractical for routine or even periodic safety
monitoring of vaccines. This is concerning,
given the importance of the public regard
for safe vaccines.20-23 In earlier studies,
the investigators identified considerable
parental support (94%) for linking their
child’s vaccination and hospital records
for vaccine safety surveillance, with high
confidence (84%) in identity protections.23
Parents also emphasised the public benefits
of generating knowledge on potential harms,
which prevailed over concerns regarding
permissions for data access.24 Our experience
demonstrates the disconnect between
public attitudes and the reality of what can
be achieved with administrative data in
Australia. While data protection is important,
it needs to be balanced against the significant
public health advantages arising from linking
data and adding value to an existing and
government-funded resource – the Australian
immunisation registers.

Key findings
Investment in Australia’s data linkage
infrastructure has expanded availability of
administrative data for health research.25
However, practical access to these data
is limited by considerable administrative
burdens and delays for researchers. The
experience of the VALiD investigators in
establishing a national integrated dataset
for safety assessment of vaccines identified
three key areas of complexity in securing
data for cross-jurisdictional projects involving
Commonwealth and state data. These relate
to: 1) distributed dataset access; 2) variable

500

Table 2: Stages of jurisdictional application process and associated application documentation.
Planning
Consultation
Preparation of application documentation
Site Specific Application Form
Public Health Application form
Data application form
Data services form(s)
Variable list form(s)
List of ICD codes
Privacy form
Documentation of funding notification
Research protocol
Ethics application
Review of draft application
Supporting documentation
In-principle data custodian support
Technical feasibility assessment form
Data custodian approval
Declaration of confidentiality
Indemnity
Investigator CVs
Ethical review
Ethics approval
Indigenous ethics approval
Allied approvals
Executive approval
Final data custodian approval
Confidentiality Agreement
Research Agreement
Total application/approval documents

NSW

QLD

QLD Mater

SA

VIC

WA

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦*

♦
♦
♦
♦

♦
♦
♦
♦

♦

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

♦
♦
♦
♦

♦
♦

♦
♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦*

♦

♦

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

♦
♦
♦
♦

MA

♦

♦

MA

1

♦

♦

♦
8

♦
♦

♦
8

♦
♦
♦(4)
♦

♦

♦

4

2

16

Notes:
*Data request negotiated directly with data custodian with ethics approval secured through ethics application.
MA=Mutual acceptance of ethics approval

and frequently non-transparent application
processes; and 3) lengthy approval times
involving multiple tiers of authorisation (Table
3). While detailed as separate challenges,
these issues are all entwined, and arise from
the distributed operational responsibility for
healthcare in Australia.
Hospitalisations, for example, are
administered by jurisdictions, while federal
programs such as the National Immunisation
Program and the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Schedule are administered by AusGov
agencies. Researchers need to negotiate
approvals with individual jurisdictional and
national agencies to obtain authorisation for
data release and/or use. Complex and lengthy
application processes ensue, progressing
through multiple tiers of authorisation for
data release approvals. Further obstacles
arise through the non-uniform application
process, with no two jurisdictions alike in
their requirements, leading to differences

in application stages (1–4), application
documents (1–16) and time to approval for
data release – ranging from nine months to
six years. Complicating the negotiations were
variations in willingness to release specific
health data variables, particularly those
deemed sensitive and with potential for reidentification of individuals, e.g. postcode.
Transparency in the application processes
also varied. At the Commonwealth level, the
application process was opaque and lacked
coordination between AusGov agencies, with
limited information provided by agencies
on sequence and timing of government
approvals. The delay in securing AusGov
authorisations also delayed approvals from
state agencies. Applications could not be
commenced or progressed in one jurisdiction
without receipt of the PIC approving release
of data from ACIR, the primary data source.
One further concerning feature was the
decision not to release hospital data in
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one jurisdiction (WA) at the final approval
stage involving WA formal data custodian
endorsement. This happened despite
our investigators completing extensive
application documentation and securing six
individual (ethics and governance) approvals.
Collectively, these challenges create
substantial time and resource commitments
for researchers brokering approvals to
achieve data release. Furthermore, as data
were no longer current by the time of
data release, revised submissions became
necessary to obtain more recent data. The
challenges encountered in seeking to link
cross-jurisdictional data are not isolated to
the current study, with parallels also seen
in a two-state immunisation effectiveness
study and a national injury surveillance
study.26-28 The difficulties encountered raise
significant ethical concerns about wasting
public research funds and serious concerns
regarding the feasibility of undertaking
research of significant public benefit due to
uncoordinated and disparate governance
structures. The 2017 Productivity Commission
Data Availability and Use Inquiry Report29
(‘PC Report’) further emphasise that delays
in data access impact on researchers’ ability
to provide real-world evidence on topics of
concern.

Recommendations
A simpler, more transparent application and
approvals model for release and linkage of
Commonwealth and jurisdictional data is
urgently needed to ensure researcher efforts
and resources are directed to investigating
study objectives rather than negotiating
the approval pathway. A uniform model
of managing approvals would also reduce
the burden experienced by data custodians
when assessing and approving dataset
requests. Four principal recommendations are
proposed to simplify data access and reduce
time to data approval and release. These are
to:
1. Prioritise access to high-utility data
collections, e.g. jurisdictional hospital

separations/ED presentations, national
registries, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
(PBS), Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS).
2. Establish multiple portals (state-specific or
institutional organisations) for managing
approvals and data release of high-utility
data.
3. Simplify data and ethics applications to a
single application process supported by a
uniform template for assessing risks of data
release.
4. Implement a web-based electronic system
with facility for monitoring progress of
data requests, approvals, data extract
preparation, linkage and data release.
Implementation of these recommendations
would benefit researchers and assist data
custodians in streamlining processes for data
access. Situating Australian Government
high-value datasets across multiple approved
agencies with a uniform application template
would: 1) clearly identify a nominated
agency(ies) for data release approvals,
thereby reducing burden (and waiting times)
related to repeated requests for AusGov
datasets with Commonwealth Departments;
2) resolve recursive legislative and policy
reviews through a standing agreement with
AusGov agencies pre-specifying conditions
of data release; 3) reduce the cost of data
extracts; 4) establish data dictionaries
consistent with minimum dataset templates;
and thereby 5) provide a uniform format
for release of data variables from crossjurisdictional and national data holdings.

Analytic environments
Allied with our recommendations is an
appeal for expanding the options for secure
analytic environments used to manage
and access integrated data. Researchers are
currently constrained by computing and
analysis environments pre-determined by
data custodial agencies. These environments
are inflexible to meet the evolving analytical
requirements of researchers. As research
questions become more complex and the
scope of datasets expands, computing

Table 3: Summary of complexities and recommendations for improving data release.
Issue
Fragmented dataset access leading to separate
administrative responsibilities for national and
cross-national data collections
Protracted approval for data release arising from
multiple tiers of authorisation with transparency
lacking on time to approval and data release
Variable and sometimes non-transparent
application processes across jurisdictions
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Recommendations
Locate high-utility data collections in a designated repositories through a
memorandum of understanding or standing agreement involving state and
Australian Government departments
Electronic system integrating data application process and monitoring progress
of approvals, data preparation, linkage and release.
Single application process situated at repository with one uniform application
form

infrastructure in the existing environment
will be insufficient for enhanced processing
of multiple extremely large datasets and
running complex statistical models. As
suggested in one submission30 to the PC
Inquiry, institutions could provide a more
flexible analysis facility for trusted users
working with linked data. Through an
accreditation mechanism, institutions would
need to demonstrate appropriate security
access measures, auditing of file access and
transfer are in place. Allowing accredited
institutions to establish secure computing
environments employing cloud-based
storage software, rather than requiring
physical servers,31 would also defray some of
the significant (and increasing) costs related
to accessing linked data.

Reforming data sharing and release
The propositions outlined above align with
recommendations detailed in the PC Report29
and proposed Australian Government
reforms32 responding to the PC Report.
Reforms would be legislated through the
new Data Sharing and Release Bill.33 The
Bill aims to increase authorised sharing
and release of Australian Government-held
data while improving data safeguards and
risk management tools to create a more
transparent environment for data sharing.33
Planned reforms for improving data sharing
and release arrangements include identifying
high-value data collections, creating
Accredited Data Authorities to facilitate data
provision, and implementing a trusted user
framework for assessing data requests.32
High-value data collections with potential
for delivering population benefits would be
designated as National Interest Datasets and
given priority access.
Accredited Data Authorities (ADAs) building
on the current Integrating Authorities model
would expand the network of agencies
with facility for linking, sharing or releasing
datasets. These Accredited Authorities
would act as intermediaries between data
custodians and users to facilitate data
availability,29,32 including national datasets
identified as high-value. Feasibly, ADAs could
be assigned to existing state-based linkage
units but also serve as an opportunity for
other non-government agencies to expand
their role to data provision. Increasing the
number of agencies available to distribute
high-value data on behalf of data custodians
would considerably reduce the bottleneck
associated with obtaining approvals, access
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and release of data currently experienced
with the AIHW.

Useful for complex linkages, the online
process provides an opportunity for dataset
representatives to collectively raise issues
about the application rather than requiring
separate discussions with individual linkage
agencies. However, there remains concerns
by these researchers that the PHRN adds yet
another layer of application to an already
convoluted application process. Despite the
central application point, there still remains a
requirement to complete ancillary approval
documentation for all jurisdictions (with
the exception of SA and TAS), rather than
consolidating data access requests into a
single uniform application.38

To increase transparency of approvals and
streamline application processes, data
access would be assessed by ADAs applying
the ‘trusted user’ model, based on the Five
Safes Framework.32 Originally intended for
identified data with scope broadened to
include deidentified data, the Framework
comprises five principles or dimensions of
data access to inform a process of safe data
release.34 These are: Safe projects (Can the
researchers be trusted?); Safe people (Is the
purpose of use appropriate? What analysis
is being done?); Safe data (Can the data
disclose identity?); Safe settings (Does the
access environment prevent unauthorised
use?); and Safe outputs (Are the statistical
results non-disclosive?).34,35 The Five Safes
provide a clearly articulated approach for
assessing data requests; noting, however,
that the five principles already underpin
specifications outlined in current data and
ethics applications. If uniformly applied by
data custodians as a singular ‘template’, the
framework would provide a transparent and
simplified mechanism for managing data
applications and also ethical review of linked
data requests. In turn, the template would
reduce burden of application review for data
custodians and ethics committees as well
as duplication of applications submitted by
researchers.

Programmatic linkages
Further considerations related to data access
and data timeliness include establishing
enduring (rather than ad hoc) linkages.
The now-named Australian Immunisation
Register (AIR) offers clear population benefits
for evaluating the impact of immunisation.
Linked with other datasets, the AIR could
be established as a routine and enduring
programmatic linkage for monitoring the
effectiveness and safety of vaccines. An
immunisation programmatic linkage could
contribute to a national system of other
programmatic linkages involving National
Interest Datasets. Programmatic linkages
could be managed by ADAs located across
and between government, non-government
and academic sectors.29,32 Inter-sectorial
programmatic linkages, would also remove
redundancy of repeated linkages of datasets.
More critically, they would enable rapid and
real-time safety surveillance to be conducted
for vaccines, particularly seasonal or new
vaccines introduced on the NIP.

The trusted user data model has been
adopted by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics36 and the AIHW, with some states
(Victoria and SA) also implementing this
model for sharing data across government
agencies.35 Trusted users would be aligned
with institutions (e.g. government agencies,
universities) with existing arrangements for
managing improper data use. Arrangements
include agreeing to legal undertakings
specifying protections for data use and
having necessary computing infrastructure
for storing data securely.37

Implications for public health

Monitoring data requests, approvals
and release
Regarding our recommendation for a
web-based monitoring system, some
elements such as progress in data requests
and approvals are considered in the online
application established by the Population
Health Research Network (PHRN).38 The online
application aims to harmonise application
and approval processes for cross-jurisdictional
and multi-jurisdictional research projects.
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The delay and complexity in accessing linked
data for vaccine safety surveillance has both
local and global public health implications.
Firstly, it results in an inability to undertake
timely epidemiological reviews to examine
associations between reported serious events
and a vaccine. This is particularly critical for
newly licensed vaccines. Surveillance of AEFI
and response to safety concerns provide the
community with assurances that vaccines
are appropriately regulated by the Australian
Government. This, in turn, engenders public
confidence and contributes to the success
of vaccination programs through ongoing
participation. Other work by the project

researchers has established community
preference for employing linked data for
public benefit, including vaccine safety
monitoring, over and above preferences for
individual consent and privacy concerns
relating to the use of identifiable data.22-24
Secondly, countries differ in the selection
and timing of vaccine administration. As
vaccine trials are usually conducted outside
Australia, information on possible safety
issues derived from these trials may lack
comparability with the Australian population.
Routine surveillance following vaccine
administration is therefore important for
providing local knowledge on AEFI, including
their incidence, occurrence and type. Thirdly,
the World Health Organization advocates
surveillance for AEFI as part of global efforts
to enhance safety information across diverse
populations, particularly for rare outcomes.
Well-resourced countries like Australia, with
strict regulatory controls on therapeutic
products and a reputation for early adoption
of new vaccines, have a role to play in these
efforts by providing safety data on routinely
administered vaccines.

Conclusion
Integration of immunisation registers with
other data collections is achievable in
Australia but remains infeasible for routine
and rapid identification of vaccine safety
concerns. Multiple lengthy authorisation
requirements, convoluted application
processes and inconsistencies in data
supplied all contribute to delayed data
availability. Prioritising access to national
and jurisdictional datasets of high value, a
single application process with transparent
assessment of data requests and an electronic
system for monitoring progress of approvals
and data release would expedite data access.
This would lead to a surveillance system that
is rapid and responsive to monitoring vaccine
safety concerns. Furthermore, data would
be available for external parties to provide a
measure of accountability for policy decisions,
independent of government assessment.
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